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Ever since the publication of Clifford Williams' paper on "The Metaphys-
ics of A- and B- Time" (1996), there has been an ongoing debate about 
whether or not there is a genuine metaphysical dispute between these two 
views and if so how, precisely, it is to be drawn. 1 With the increased popu-
larity of presentism, the debate or lack of such between presentism and 
"eternalism" (the currently fashionable name for the B-theory) has taken 
center stage. 2 Since for some, "eternalism" is compatible with either the A-
or the B-theory of time, the presentism/eternalism debate has reignited the 
original general question of how, if at all, A- and B-time are to be distin-
guished (Zimmerman 2005). The title of my paper is meant to signal that I 
too am going to enter into the question of the legitimacy of the dispute, but 
the limitations of this essay must be stated at the outset. I a·m not going to 
be debating these different views in the sense of giving arguments for and 
against the various gambits in the philosophy of time, 3 nor am I going to be 
directly concerned with the difference between A- and B-theories (or even, 
more specifically, presentism and eternalism) since I believe that the proper 
way to draw the lines in the metaphysical debate cuts across all those views. 
My primary purpose is rather to clarify a genuine debate and to indicate 
some of the ontological issues that are important for the future of the phi-
losophy of time. To accomplish that goal I shall discuss a third view, the 
Russellian theory of time (hereafter "R-theory"), and distinguish it from 
A- and B-theories, including presentism and eternalism (at least in some of 
its commonly accepted forms), and defend it against mistaken formulations 
and misguided criticisms. 
I shall proceed as follows: In section 1, I will use an ambiguity in McTag-
gart's notion of the B-series to draw a distinction between different views 
of temporal relations that I believe separate various disputants in the A-, B-, 
and R-time debate. I shall then, in section 2, further clarify the R-theory and 
explain how an ambiguity in McTaggart's B-series underlies some typical, yet 
fallacious, arguments against it. In section 3, I will use what we have learned 
in the previous sections to refute those who defend and those who reject (for 
the wrong reasons) Williams' indistinguishability thesis. Finally, in section 
4, I shall turn to a paper by Jonathan Tallant (2008) in which he argues that 
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the view that temporal relations are simple and unanalyzable is false, because 
they serve no function and thus are ontologically redundant. I will show that 
Tallant's argument rests on a failure to appreciate the differences between the 
Russellian theory--his intended target-and the view(s) of time he criticizes. 
1 MCTAGGART, TEMPORAL RELATIONS, AND THE R-THEORY 
For McTaggart, as we ordinarily conceive of time and, as time or events or 
positions in time appear to us, it involves the distinctions of past, present, and 
future from which the terms "A-series" and "A-theory" are derived, and the 
relations of earlier/later than and simultaneous with (called "B-relations") 
from which the terms "B-series" and "B-theory" are derived. The ontologist 
of time asks what category or categories of intrinsically temporal entity or 
entities there are or must there be to explain the temporal phenomena. To 
answer the ontological question: "What is the nature of time?", therefore, 
is to give an inventory of all temporal entities, or rather, of all kinds of such 
entities there are.4 Are there intrinsically temporal individuals or particulars; 
time points or moments of absolute time capable of existing unoccupied? 
Does time consist of relations, and if so are those relations internal, grounded 
in the nature or properties of one or both of their terms, or are they exter-
nal, grounded in an additional entity obtaining between its terms, or some 
combination of both? Are temporal relations reducible to some non-temporal 
relation such as causation or entropic increase or are they irreducible? Are 
there intrinsically temporal (non-relational) properties such as the A-series 
properties pastness, presentness, and futurity (hereafter "A-properties"), or 
the so-called "coordinate qualities" such as being at t1 and being at t/5 Is 
there a speCial category of temporal change or temporal becoming or is it to 
be understood in terms of some other category already delineated? For my 
purposes, which are, on the one hand, to delineate a Russellian ontology of 
time so as to avoid confusions that might lead to a debunking of the meta-
physics of time and, on the other hand, to defend the R-theory against some 
spurious objections, I want to concentrate on the B-series and ask: What are 
the ontological facts and what are their simple temporal constituents needed 
to account for objects standing in temporal relations? 
Ontological facts are not essentially truth conditions or truth makers 
since facts have an objective existence independently of the meaning and 
truth of language and thought, for there are facts in a world without minds 
and language users. Facts are introduced to ground ontologically the hav-
ing of properties and the standing in relations and more generally the unity 
of complexes consisting of things, properties, and relations. Thus for the 
Russellian, facts are a category of their own over and above a list of their 
constituents. \Vhat temporal facts there are and how they are related to 
time will be an important element in understanding the different omologi-
cal accounts of time as we shall see in section 3. 
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What, then, is the B-series? There are difficulties with the term "B-series" 
and "B-theory" because they originate from McTaggart and his notion of 
the B-series is ambiguous in a way that has led commentators to either 
misunderstand McTaggart's positive conception of time and therefore his 
negative argument for its unreality, or prejudge the issue against the Rus-
sellian ontology of time. On the standard interpretation of McTaggart, 
there is both a B-series whose terms are related by Russellian simple and 
unanalyzable temporal relations ("R-relations" for short) and an A-series 
(or series of such) whose terms exemplify the monadic temporal properties 
of pastness, presentness, and futurity, and there is temporal becoming, the 
acquiring and shedding of A-properties by the terms in the B-series. Thus, 
it is typical for interpreters of McTaggart to attribute to him the view that 
there are A-properties "in addition to the B-series and its unchanging rela-
tions" (Savitt (2001): 261). This view is called the "A/B theory of time." It 
is the standard interpretation of McTaggart's positive conception of time 
(but it is not McTaggart's)." 
There is another interpretation of the B-series and therefore of the B-the-
ory that is McTaggart's, but is not Russellian. According to this view, the 
B-series is analyzable (reducible) in terms of the application of the A-series 
to the non-temporal, but ordered C-series whose generating relation is (for 
McTaggart) included in.7 On this view the direction of time and its transi-
tory or dynamic aspect are grounded in A-properties moving along a non-
temporal C-series. According to McTaggart the terms of the C-series have 
an intrinsic order, but do not have an intrinsic direction or, as Broad calls 
it, an "intrinsic sense." By an intrinsic direction or sense is meant the differ-
ence between ABC D and DC B A. In our experience of time and change, 
events or things in time occur in a certain direction, since A is earlier than 
B is earlier than Cis earlier than D, rather than the other way around. For 
McTaggart, it is the application of the A-series to the C-series that generates 
a B-series with a direction or sense. For that reason he says, 
The B series, on the other hand, is not ultimate. For given a C-series 
of permanent relations of terms, which is not in itself temporal and 
therefore is not a B-series, and given the further fact that the terms of 
this C-series also form an A-series, ... it results that the terms of the 
C-series become a B-series, those which are placed first, in the direc-
tion from past to future, being earlier than those whose places are far-
ther in the direction of the future. (1908: 463-64) 
Clearly, the resulting B-series is not Russellian. On the Russellian view, 
temporal relations (call them "R-relations") are not to be identified with 
causal, spatial, entropic, or any other kind of relations. Thus the R-theory 
differs from the theory espoused by most B-theorists who analyze the direc-
tion of time from earlier to later in terms of the direction of causality (Mel-
lor 1998, 2009; le Poidevin 1991, 2007). Moreover, in calling temporal 
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relations unanalyzable a Russellian means that they cannot be reduced to 
the properties of their terms and, indeed, the terms of temporal relations 
have no intrinsically temporal properties such as pastness, presentness, 
and/or futurity, since there are none. R-relations are not analyzable, as in 
McTaggart, in the terms of a non-temporal series having temporal proper-
ties. On the R-theory, the only category of intrinsically temporal entities 
are relations; there are no temporal individuals, such as moments or time 
points; there are no monadic temporal A-properties; and there is no abso-
lute becoming understood either as the coming into and going out of exis-
tence of objects or events, or as the donning and doffing of Aproperties. 
In other words, on the R-theory, time is relational, that is, all ontological 
facts about time are understood as grounded in relations and that includes 
durations such as lasts as long as, or lasts longer than. 
Russell's account of the direction of the B-series also differs from McTag-
gart's. According to Russell's view in Principles of Mathematics, when a 
relation relates two individuals there is an order in that connection, in that 
it does so with a sense: the relation goes from one relatum to the other. As 
Russell puts it: 
... it is characteristic of a relation of two terms that it proceeds, so to 
speak, from one to the other. This is what may be called the sense of 
the relation, and is ... the source of order and series. It must be held 
as an axiom that aRb implies and is implied by a relational proposition 
bR'a, in which the relation R' proceeds from b to a, and may or may not 
be the same relation as R .... The sense of a relation is a fundamental 
notion, which is not capable of definition. (1938: 95-96) 
For Russell, order must be taken as primitive. What we need is an order 
between a and bas related by R. Russell's account secures this order by build-
ing it into the relation itself; relations, upon Russell's account in PM, invariably 
have a sense. An asymmetrical relation generates a series because it provides 
a structure to each fact, since each fact has an order, an intrinsic order. Rus-
sell argued that there is a difference between the two facts a R b and b R a, 
and if the relation is asymmetrical then only one of those facts obtains. It is 
a synthetic a priori truth that if a relation is asymmetrical the converse of the 
relation cannot obtain. That is, for Russell a two-place relation holds always 
in a definite direction between its terms either from a to b or from b to a.8 
In Theory of Knowledge, The 1913 Manuscript (1984), he gives a dif-
ferent analysis of order. According to it, Russell assumes in his ontological 
analysis of order in relational facts (e.g., a is earlier than b) order relations 
such as "being the first relatum" and "being the second relatum." These 
relations hold between relata and facts. Since all series have a direction, 
Russell differs from McTaggart in both his account of the transitory aspect 
of time and its direction. For McTaggart what gives time a direction and 
its transitory character are changing A-characteristics. A Russellian will 
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ground the transitory or dynamic aspect of time in the relation "is earlier 
than," and the direction of a whole series is aggregated from the order rela-
tions for all the relational facts contained in it. 
In this chapter I make no attempt to defend either of Russell's accounts of 
temporal order against criticisms that have been lodged against them.9 My 
intention rather is to indicate that these accounts (and others like it) differ not 
only from all A-theoretic accounts, but also from the standard B-theoretic 
accounts of the direction of rime as well. For on the standard B-theory, the 
direction of time is founded upon the direction of causation or entropy, but 
in a Russell ian relational ontology there are reasons to reject such grounding. 
First, the phenomenon of temporal succession is fundamental, whereas cau-
sation and entropy are rather derived and complicated relations. A Russell ian 
ontological analysis complies with the principle that a fundamental phenom-
enon such as succession should be grounded on a simple entity such as the 
R-relation if at all possible. Second, Russellians will reject causal accounts of 
the direction of time since they adopt an empirical principle of acquaintance 
according to which we must be acquainted with the simple entities of one's 
ontology. What excludes causal theories of time is that we perceive many 
temporal successions while we don't perceive the relation "causes" or "has 
greater entropy than" in those cases. Furthermore, Russellians will argue 
that causation and entropy are circular as earlier-relations since they presup-
pose temporal succession and the direction of time. 
Whether these objections can be sustained is a large issue that I do nor 
intend to explore here. My reason for raising them is primarily to indicate 
that a comment such as that by Craig Bourne, who asserts that "onto-
logically speaking, there is only one way to be a tenseless theory" (2007: 
10-11), is not accurate. 10 Bourne's statement overlooks the ontologically 
significant difference between the R-and B-theory analyses of the temporal 
phenomenon of succession and the direction of time. 
To sum up, the B-series can be understood as Russell understood it as 
involving unanalyzable temporal relations between its terms, which are 
thereby temporal, or as McTaggart understood it as involving a non-tempo-
ral relation between timeless terms in a C-series plus something more, tem-
poral properties and temporal becoming. These two notions of the B-series 
are not clearly recognized or distinguished, and a sliding from one to the 
other is prevalent in discussions of McTaggart and the "B-theory," with 
often unfortunate results both for the interpretation of McTaggart's para-
dox and for the proper interpretation of the Russell ian theory of time. 
2 THE R-THEORY DEFENDED AGAINST SOME OBJECTIONS 
To see how easy it is to confuse these two notions of the B-series, and the 
mistaken consequences of doing so, consider the two typical ways of stat-
ing the B-theory currently in vogue. Philosophers say that on the B-theory 
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past, present, and future events are equally real and that no events are 
really past, present, and future-claims that taken together are prima facie 
contradictory. However, if the B~series is understood as analyzable in terms 
of the application of the A-series (and temporal becoming) to the C-series, 
then it is correct to say that all terms of the C-series whether or not they are 
past, present, or future exist; the B-series requires it. On the other hand, if 
one interprets the B-series as a series generated by the intrinsically temporal 
relation "is earlier than," then there are no A-properties, and in that sense 
none of the terms are past, present, or future. 11 
If, however, one confuses the Russellian B-series (henceforth the "R-se-
ries") with the McTaggartian B-series, then since the terms of the R-series 
do not exemplify A-properties, one may mistakenly conclude that the Rus-
sell ian series is not a genuinely temporal series, but is a static, changeless 
series, whose terms are timeless, abstract objects or a tatum simul (or a 
block) of sempiternal continuants. For a good example of how confusing 
these two notions of the B~series (and hence B-rheory) can lead to mistaken 
interpretations of the Russell ian view, consider the following passage from 
C. D. Broad's classic chapter "Ostensible Temporality" in his Examination 
of McTaggart's Philosophy. Broad claims that Russell's theory, 
seems to presuppose that all events, past, present, and future, in some 
sense "co-exist," and stand to each other timelessly or sempiternally 
in determinate relations of precedence. But how are we to think of this 
"co-existence" of events? It seems to me that the events and their tem-
poral relations are thought of either by analogy with timeless abstract 
objects such as integers in their order of magnitude, or by analogy 
with simultaneous persistent particulars, like points on a line in spatial 
order from left to right. (1938: 307) 
These conclusions do indeed follow if one treats the Russellian R-series as 
McTaggart's B-series minus A-properties as a C-series, for then the R-series 
(like the C-series) could be confused with, say, "greater than" between inte-
gers or "to the left of" between points on a line. If, however, the two dif-
ferent ontological accounts of temporal relations are kept distinct, then the 
fallacious inferences do not follow. 
Broad's mistakes are reinforced if one confuses the tenselessness (or per-
manence of) B-statements (henceforth "R-statements") with the eternal 
duration of the terms such statements are about, or the tenselessness of 
B-facts (henceforth "R-facts"') with the timelessness of the terms contained 
within them. 12 Of course, both implications of the Russellian theory are 
egregious mistakes. The permanent truth value of R-statements, for exam-
ple, "a is earlier than b" does not imply that a and b are and always will 
be unless one assumes that present truth implies present existence, which a 
Russellian will deny since he separates time and existence. It also does not 
follow that the terms of temporal relations are timeless abstract objects, 
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analogous to numbers; indeed, the very opposite is the case since the terms 
of temporal relations are, by that very fact, in time and so are temporal. 
For the Russellian, R~facts, while they are not themselves in time, are 
indeed temporal since they contain temporal relations. R~facts are entities 
in their own right over and above their constituents, and as such they are 
not in time in that they do not exemplify non-relational temporal properties 
or temporal relations. In that sense time, understood as a Russellian series 
composed of a conjunction of R-facts, is timeless. This view gives some 
meaning to an aphorism I favor, namely, time is timeless. In other words, 
though time contains temporal relations, time does not exemplify them. 
Time is timeless in the further sense that the ontological ground of tem-
poral phenomena are relations and on the R-theory relational universals 
such as "occurring earlier than" are timeless. A good formulation of the 
timelessness of time is stated by J. S. Mackenzie: 
There is no time outside the process. Hence the process as a whole 
might be said to be eternal though every particular part in it has a place 
in time .... The process as a whole, when we thus conceive of it, is not 
in time, rather time is in the process. Time is simply the aspect of suc-
cessiveness which the eternal process contains. (1955: 404) 
It might be thought, however, that if the whole process (or conjunction of 
R-facts) is not in time, then there is something missing, namely, the transi-
tion from one time to the next; or the sense that R-facts are dynamic and 
not static and that time involves passage. But this strikes me as a mistake. 
Transition and passage do exist on the Russellian theory and they are com-
patible with an R-theoretic ontology. 
For the Russellian the phenomenology of temporal passage is R-theo-
retic, that is, temporal passage or the dynamic aspect of time is grounded 
in a temporal succession or transition from earlier to later temporal items. 
Thus, an R-theorist should not fear that the words "temporal succession" 
or "transition" commit them to A-succession or A-transition. Succession 
is not an A-relation, but it is not a static relation either. Succession is not a 
transition from non-existence to existence or from futurity to presentness 
to pastness, but it does not follow that it is no transition at all. A transi-
tion is a temporal succession of opposite states and succession is based on 
the earliet-than relation. 13 A temporal relational fact itself doesn't change 
(it is, as explained earlier, timeless), but may be a change and in that sense 
involves a transition from earlier to later events or particulars (or more 
neutrally, temporal items). 
That the "is earlier than" relation is dynamic is convincingly argued for 
by the German philosopher Erwin Tegtmeier in the following passage: 
\'Vhat we bear according to Russell, when we hear the c-rone preced-
ing the d-rone, is the relational universals of "occurring earlier than" 
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together with its relata. We hear nothing else. Let us assume that we 
don't recognise the first tone [as] a c and the second as a d. Thus we 
hear only a temporal fact which as such is a dynamic fact .... If the fact 
is dynamic, which one can take for granted, the relational universal in 
it must be dynamic, too. Now, Russell introduces the relational uni-
versal as the one which holds between the two tones in the fact of our 
example. One can conclude that the relation "occurring earlier than" is 
a dynamic relation. (2010: 42) 
Thus, the notion that Russellian time is static and A-time is dynamic is 
rooted in confusion. McTaggart thinks that an order relation, such as tempo-
ral sequence, which satisfies the conditions of asymmetry and transitivity, is 
thereby not a dynamic relation, but that is a further consequence of confusing 
a Russellian temporal series, which is dynamic, with McTaggart's C-series, 
which is static. McTaggart concludes that to account for the dynamic aspect 
of time one must introduce A-transition. Thus, the argument by McTaggart, 
that Russell's analysis is inadequate insofar as it is unchanging (since it misses 
the dynamic aspect), arises from a methodological muddle. The ontological 
analysis of time and change must not and need not attempt to duplicate time 
or be changing itself. As Tegtmeier has put it, 
As to J\1cTaggart's argument that the B-series cannot be temporal 
because it does not change, it is misleading and wrong mainly for two 
reasons. Firstly, the task is to analyse ontologically the general struc-
ture of temporal phenomena, the task is to analyse the dynamics, not 
to dynamise the analysis. The task of science, including philosophy, is 
to find out what the entities involved in its research object are and what 
their laws are; it is to describe and explain, not to imitate the object. 
(2007: 54; emphasis added). 
An analogous point was made earlier by Frank Ramsey in a handwritten 
manuscript subsequently published as "Ramsey's 'Note on Time'," (Ram-
sey 2006). He explains how the different ways of representing an R-series 
may mistakenly lead us to think that we need to add something more to 
a sequence to make it temporaL Ramsey notes that when we try to imag-
ine a series of events in time we can do this either by going "through the 
events one after another in the order in which they happened, as when one 
rehearses a tune in one's mind" (2006: 157), or we may "want to have all 
the events in our minds at once in order to better see their relations, we then 
imagine them spread out before us along a line like the notes in a score" 
(2006: 157). The resulting series is, of course, a spatial representation of a 
temporal series, and then qua spatial series the "sense" of time from earlier 
to later is lost. If, however, one fails to distinguish these two representa-
tions of time, or confuses the dynamic R-relation of "earlier than" with its 
static spatial representation on a line or notes on a score, one may conclude 
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that we must introduce time over and above the series of notes spread out 
in space as something that "moves" and gives the series its sense and direc-
tion, as some A-theorists do. For McTaggart (1908, 1927) it is the A-series 
or trio of properties that are donned and doffed by the members of the 
C-series. For Broad in Scientific Thought (1923), it is the coming into exis-
tence of what did not previously exist and with it the adding on to what 
already exists, and for some presentists it is abstract propositions related 
by ersatz B relations changing their truth value or their categorial status as 
they become concrete (Crisp 2007). 
To counteract these moves that lead to unpalatable results, Ramsey 
continues, 
But clearly the whole difficulty is a mistake; the events are really in 
temporal order one before the other; each is present to or simultaneous 
with itself, future to the preceding ones past to the subsequent. The 
moving present is really the series of events themselves; only when the 
temporal series is replaced in imagination by a spatial series, do we 
try to restore its temporal quality by introducing presentness from the 
outside. This is not to say we cannot legitimately represent a temporal 
series by a spatial one, provided we are prepared to keep to it to all 
(say) ["] to the left of["] to stand by convention for ["]hefore["] and 
not attempt simultaneously an imaginative realization of the temporal 
relationship. (2006: 157-58) 
While I certainly agree with Ramsey in maintaining that the representation 
of the reality of time, either pictorially (by a mental or physical diagram) or 
I might add, linguistically (by the use of tenseless sentences), should not be 
confused with the temporal reality so represented, and with Tegtmeier that 
the analysis of time should not require or involve a replication, reproduc-
tion, or imitation of the temporal phenomenon, there still remains the task 
of providing an ontological ground for temporal relations. I have already 
suggested that for a Russellian ontologist, simple and unanalyzable rela-
tional universals between particulars or events (not absolute moments) are 
sufficient to do that. However, the critics of B-and R-theories demur. Many 
of their arguments are certainly worthy of consideration, but I shall limit 
myself, in the final section of this paper, to a brief discussion of only one, 
namely, Jonathan Tallant's argument that the view that there are simple 
and unanalyzable temporal relations: that is, the R-theory is false because 
"we can describe a world functionally equivalent to our own (assuming 
our world is as the eternalist says it is), without making reference to B-the-
oretic relations." (2008: 118) I shall argue that insofar as Tallant believes 
he is modeling a Russellian ontology of time he confuses the R-theory with 
either McTaggart's version of the B-series (without A-properties), or some 
non-Russellian version of the B-theory. Before I turn to Tallant, however, 
l want to discuss a recent debate, spurred by Clifford Williams' articles 
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over the legitimacy of the A- and B-time controversy. I will argue that it 
too suffers from a failure to appreciate how both those views differ from 
the R-theory, and thus fail to realize that what is most fundamentally at 
stake in the debate between the disputants in the metaphysics of time are 
the different accounts of the ontological status of temporal relations (and 
transition), temporal facts, and the relation both kinds have to time. 
3 SPURIOUS ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST 
THE INDISTINGUISHABILITY THESIS 
The usual way of referring to B-time is as a block universe, static, eternal, 
and tenseless. All of these appellations mistakenly suggest that time is a 
space-like block, a changeless, timeless whole, or a sempiternal continu-
ant, and for those reasons are best avoided in characterizing the R-theory. 
A-time, on the other hand, is referred to as a dynamic, tensed time in which 
time or events in time are passing or flowing, and is the basis of ordinary 
change. Williams argues that these two ways of describing time omit some-
thing that is common to both. In both A- and B-time there is transition: 
A-transition in A-time and B-transition in B-time, but he argues that there 
is no difference between these two kinds of transition, and thus, there is 
nothing different about these two kinds of time. 
In a recent article, Mikel Burley (2006) responds to Williams by argu-
ing that there is a genuine disagreement between A-time and B-time. Bur-
ley claims that if we grant that time involves transition there is a clear 
difference between the two theories: A-theorists are realists with regard 
to time, since they believe that transition is an intrinsic feature of events 
independently of our experience of it, whereas B-theorists are anti-realists 
since they deny that transition is a feature of events independently of our 
experience of it. 
I shall argue, however, that there are mistakes in both Williams' and 
Burley's reasoning for and against the indistinguishability thesis. Williams 
correctly recognizes that transition is essential to both our experience and 
reality of time; that it is known ostensively and that it involves a primi-
tive temporal relation (2003: 89), but he mistakenly argues that there is no 
difference between these two kinds of transition since he misunderstands 
A-time as countenancing R-relations. Burley, on the other hand, correctly 
rejects the indistinguishability thesis, but he misinterprets the difference 
since he fails to consider R-time or misunderstands it by claiming that 
B-time is anti-realist. 
To connect this critique with my earlier discussion concerning two 
interpretations of the B-series, note that if we treat temporal relations as 
R-relations then one might think that adding temporal properties or some 
other form of A-change to the R-series is redundant and problematic since 
transition is already grounded in the R-relation. On the other hand, if we 
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treat temporal relations ontologically on a par with C-relations, as Burley 
seems to do, then you will think of the R-theory as anti-realist, since it ren-
ders transition a subjective phenomenon and thereby leaves out something 
essential to time. Williams and Burley are guilty of these mistakes, as I shall 
next demonstrate. 
Williams argues that the usual ways of representing A-transition and 
B-transition makes A-transition incoherent and misrepresents B-time. 
He says: 
Suppose we say, first, that in A-time presentness, or the now, moves 
from time to time, whereas in B-time there is nothing that moves from 
time to time. This is a natural way of picturing the different kinds of 
transition-it seems to add something to B-time that is missing from it, 
namely, the movement of the present. This something more, according 
to advocates of A-time, is the rock-bottom peculiarity of time that is 
missing from B-time. (2003: 81) 
For Williams, this interpretation of A-time, involving presentness mov-
ing from time to time along a temporal series, is mistaken since it ren-
ders A-transition incoherent: it gives rise to questions regarding the rate 
of movement, the need for a second time dimension and more generally 
McTaggart's paradox. In other words, there already is A-transition in the 
B-relation qua R-relation and for that reason there is no need to introduce 
a moving now in A-time, which just duplicates the transition unnecessarily. 
The interpretation of B-time as lacking transition is, Williams maintains, 
also mistaken since it treats particulars in time like points in space since 
"all events in it are somehow 'eternally there,' like the parts of a big block 
that are fixed forever in the block" (2003: 82). On the proper interpreta-
tion of the B-theory, the terms in B-time are related by a primitive temporal 
relation of succession that grounds transition. Once Williams eliminates 
A-properties from this typical yet mistaken understanding of A-time (as 
involving R-relations and A-properties) and then identifies B-relations with 
R-relations, his indistinguishability thesis becomes compelling, since there 
would then be no differences between the A-, B-, and R- accounts of transi-
tion because they all involve only R-relations. 
However, Williams' indistinguishability thesis is mistaken. There are as 
many different accounts of transition as there are different accounts of tem-
poral relations, and all but one of them is decidedly anti-Russellian. On the 
typical presentist accounts, transition is analyzed in terms of the coming 
into and going out of existence of presently existing entities, and the ground 
of temporal relations is in what presently exists. 14 For ersatz presentists 
such as Thomas Crisp (2007) and Craig Bourne (2007), who recognize 
ersatz B-relations in their ontology, temporal relations and the facts they 
enter into are fundamentally different from R-relations and R-facts. The 
fundamental difference concerns not only the constituents of the R-facts, 
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but also the relation of these facts to time. Ersatz B-relations have timeless 
objects (abstract propositions) as terms, and thus ersatz B-facts are time-
less not only because they are outside of time, but also because they are 
timeless in the further sense of not having any temporal constituents. On 
the R-theory, a temporal relation cannot obtain between timeless objects, 
but must have temporal objects as terms. Therefore, R-facts, while nor in 
time, are themselves the ground of time because they have as constituents 
R-relations whose terms exist in time. 
For some open future or growing block theorists, C. D. Broad, for exam-
ple, temporal relations are not R-relations since transition is grounded in the 
coming into existence of fresh slices of existence that are added to the sum 
total of existence. On this view, temporal relations come into existence as 
events become. For example, when an event e is present it does not stand in 
the "is earlier than" relation to anything, but at the next moment it acquires 
the relational property of being earlier than, say, event e'. In that case, how 
ever, the fact e is earlier than e' cannot be timeless in the sense of being 
outside of time since there is a time when it does not exist and a time when it 
comes into existence, namely, when e· does. Thus, on the open future theory 
both temporal relations and the temporal relational facts they enter into exist 
in time, and so are quite unlike R-relations and R-facts that are timeless. 
On the full A-theory, or at least one version of it, according to which 
there are past, present, and future times or events, the temporal relation 
that obtains between them is not an R-relation. On the version of the A-the-
ory that I have elsewhere called "the modified A-theory~ (2004b) temporal 
relations are not primitive or onrologically on a par with A-characteristics; 
rather A-characteristics are more fundamental, and are essential to the 
ontological structure of time because tempora I relations can hold between 
terms only if those terms have A-characteristics, and conversely, given 
events with definite A-characteristics, a certain temporal relation must hold 
between them. In "Ostensible Temporality" Broad explains this ontologi .. 
cal assay of temporal relations in the following passage: 
Even if we reject the view that "X is earlier than Y" means that there is 
a difference in the A-characteristics of X andY and that this difference 
is positive, there remains another alternative which would suffice for 
McTaggart's purpose. lt might be sr1ggested that the relation "earlier 
than" can hold only between terms which have A-characteristics; just 
as harmonic relations can hold only between terms which have pitch. 
And it might be suggested that the degree of the B-relation between 
two terms depends on the difference between the determinate values 
of their A-characteristics; just as the harmonic relations between two 
notes depend on the difference between the absolute pitches of the two. 
In fact, to use an expression of Meinong's, we might he able to see that 
B-relations are "founded upon" differences in the Acharacteristics of 
the related terms_ (1938: 302-3; emphasis added.) 
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Thus, on the modified A-theory events cannot stand in a temporal rela-
tion unless they exemplify A-properties and therefore, the temporal relation 
between events on this version of the A-theory is nor an R-relation whose 
terms neither exemplify A-properties, nor are they "founded upon" them. 
Clearly, then, there is a dispute between A- and R-theorists, and, as we 
have seen earlier, there is also a debate between B-and R-theorists over the 
proper analysis of temporal relations. 
Burley, who believes that there is a distinction between A-transition 
and B-transition as the basis for the distinction between the two theories, 
objects that B-transition is not really an objective transition at all, both 
because "the B-theory construes this transition as a purely experiential 
phenomenon-as a feature, not of events, but exclusively of the way in 
which they are experienced" (2006: 416), and because a world without 
objective A-transition is a world without time. In other words, without 
transitory A-properties or A--transition in some other form, for example, as 
emerging and passing away, critics claim that the B-series, though it has the 
same formal properties as a temporal series, is not a genuinely temporal, 
but a timeless, changeless series. 
Burley is correct in that Russellian transition or passage is not a feature of 
events (which are particulars or facts), but rather, transition is wholly based 
on the simple and unanalyzable "is earlier than" relation_ It does not follow, 
however, that transition is not a feature of the world, but exclusively of the 
way in which transition is experiencedY On the contrary, Russell's dynamic 
relational universal "occurring earlier than" is a feature of the world because 
it is experienced, that is, an object of acquaintance. Thus, to assert that the 
R-relation and the facts it enters into are static is also false since the fact that 
the a-tone precedes the c-tone contains a dynamic temporal relation and is 
therefore a dynamic temporal fact in a temporal series. To think otherwise, 
as Burley clearly does, is to misunderstand the Russellian view in a way that 
has its roots in McTaggart's conception of the B-series, and it fails to see what 
is really at issue between the several theories of time, namely, their different 
accounts of temporal relations, the temporal facts that such relations enter 
into, and the relation of those facts to time. 
Temporal relations are unique in that they involve a process or transition 
or succession from one term to the next. This difference between temporal 
relations and all other non-temporal relations is difficult to recognize, since 
our linguistic representation of a non-temporal series takes time to express, 
and the pictorial representation of a temporal series may be momentary 
and static. Nevertheless, the earlier-series is a special series, a real progres-
sion from earlier to later events, and not the other way around, and this, 
on one of Russell's views of the direction of a relation, is grounded in the 
relation itself. For these reasons, the Russell ian will reject claims that with-
out tense and becoming the temporality and direction of time are without 
foundation or that R-time is anti-realist. On the R-theory, the foundation 
of real time is the simple and unanalyzable R-relation_ 
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To recapitulate, if Burley thinks of the B-series as McTaggart does, then 
in order for there to be transition you will need something moving along 
the non-temporal C-series. On the other hand, if we think of the B-series 
as Russell and Williams do (something simple, unanalyzable, and known 
ostensibly) as generated by R-relations, then the notion of A-transition as 
something over and above R-relations will he redundant and incoherent. 
When these two notions of the B-series get confused, one will claim, as 
Williams does, that there is no difference between A-transition (without 
temporal properties) and B-transition (since they both involve primitive 
R-relations), or as Burley does (or at least implies), that in B-time there 
is no transition since there are no A-properties, whereas in A-time there 
is transition because there are A-properties. If, however, we keep the two 
interpretations of the B-series with their two different analyses of temporal 
relations and transition distinct, and recognize that there are several other 
analyses of temporal relations and transition, then there is an ontological 
difference between the A-, B-, and R-theories of time, and the debate over 
the correct analysis of transition remains a legitimate question in the meta-
physics of time. 
Before concluding this section I want to mention a useful paper by 
Natalja Deng (2010), who criticizes Burley and some B-theorists, for 
example, Mellor (1998), Le Poidevin (2007), and Falk (2003), for failing 
to see that transition is an objective feature of B-time, and Williams for 
claiming that there is nothing at stake in the A-versus- B debate. My only 
misgiving about Deng's paper is that she overlooks what I think is ulti-
mately at stake between the various disputants by reducing the issue to 
the following three cia ims that are asserted by the B-theorist and denied 
by the A-theorist: 
1) Eternalism: All times exist and are ontologically on a par. 
2) There are no monadic temporal properties of pastness, presentness, 
or futurity, but only dyadic temporal relations of succession, prece-
dence, and simultaneity. 
3) There are no tensed facts, but only tenseless facts, such as the fact that 
my writing this {occurs} (tenselessly) on a Friday, and the fact that this 
event {precedes) the event of your reading this by a certain interval. 
(2010: 741) 
The problem with this way of framing the debate is that it doesn't capture 
some essential features of the Russellian theory, for example, that times 
and durations are understood relationally and that the ontological sta-
tus of temporal relations and transition are the fundamental issues upon 
which the other claims are parasitic, nor does Deng consider the differences 
between A-, B-, and R-facts both in terms of their constituents and their 
relation to time. 
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4 A CRITIQUE OF TALLANT'S "WHAT IS IT TO 'B' A RELATION?" 
Not only can the failure to recognize different assays of temporal relations 
and transition lead to the indistinguishability thesis, it can also lead to mis-
taken formulations and misguided criticisms of the R-theory. For example, 
Jonathan Tallant purports to demonstrate that "the view that temporal 
relations are simple and unanalyzable (e.g., Oaklander 2004, 24--25) com-
mits us to B-relations as ontological gratuities with no function" (2008: 
118). His overall argument is that it is possible to construct a world func-
tionally equivalent to a B-theoretic eternalist that can account for all the 
temporal facts that an eternalist can account for, but does not contain E-re-
lations. Since B-relations don't do anything, their existence ought not to be 
countenanced in any adequate ontology of time. 
Since Tallant's main target is my commitment to simple and unanalyzable 
temporal relations, it would seem reasonable to assume that wherever he uses 
the term "B-theory" he is referring to the R-theory; however, that is not the 
case. It becomes clear that there are not two, but three different notions of 
the "B-theory" and while he confuses them all, he never directly deals with 
the Russellian theory of time. "The B-theory" may be McTaggart's B-series, 
i.e., the C-series and A-series together with absolute becoming; a Russellian 
R-series whose terms have some duration, or a four-dimensionalist (4D) view 
of the B-series that contains instantaneous (non-durational) contents or time 
points. Whether a four-dimensionalist can countenance R-relations in her 
ontology is questionable. Russell's temporal relations are based on a principle 
of acquaintance according to which the simple entities in one's ontology must 
be those we are acquainted with, but we are not acquainted with durationless 
points or contents as the terms of temporal relations. In any case, Tallant's 
critique of the B-theory is directed at the 4D variety of the B-theory and not 
the Russellian R-theory. Thus, Tallant's critique of the R-theory is an attack 
on a straw person because he either (a) assumes that the terms of R-relations 
are timeless because he confuses the R-theory with McTaggart's analysis of 
B-relations, or (h) he identifies a commitment to simple and unanalyzable 
temporal relations with the 4D view that, unlike the Russellian view, treats 
the terms of temporal relations as time points or the contents of such that 
have zero duration. To see what is involved in these points and to defend 
them, I shall turn to his paper. 
In the opening paragraph of his paper, Tallant asserts "My conclusion 
is that if one adopts eternalism, then the unreality of time looks a better 
option than the B-theory" (2008: 117). What I want to argue is that even 
before we consider his argument against the B-theory, the ambiguity of the 
term "eternalism" mirrors the ambiguity found in the term "B-series," and 
his equivocal use of "eternalism" vitiates his attack on the B-theory and 
the R-theory. 
The following passage will be used to illustrate my point. Tallant says: 
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In the opening paragraphs I drew a distinction between eternalists and 
B-rheorists. Such a distinction seems plausible. Eternalists claim that 
all instants are on an equal ontological footing. Most, if not all, B-the-
orists agree with this claim. But a B-theorist is, whilst an eternalist is 
not, committed to the further claim that there are temporal relations, 
of "earlier than" and "later-than", that hold between these instants. 
Hence, an eternalist can hold their position without also being a B·the-
orisL (2008: 118; emphasis added.) 
Tallant's argument in this passage is confused. To see why, let's look at his 
understanding of the term "eternalism." He says, "Eternalists claim that 
all instants are on an equal ontological footing. Most, if not all, B-theorists 
agree with this claim" (2008: 118), but do they agree? Much hangs on what 
is meant by "instant." If an instant is a timeless instant or a timeless point, 
so that he is claiming that eternalism, means that "all timeless instants/ 
points are on an equal onrological fooring" then there is noB- orR-theorist 
who would accept that our world is as the eternalist, says it is (for that 
would just play into the hands of those who allege, like Broad, Craig, and 
others, that without A-properties the "B-series" is indistinguishable from 
the series of integers), a I though, of course, an eternalist1 can hold his posi-
tion without also being a B- or R-theorist. 
Alternatively, if an instant is a temporal entity, whether a durationless 
time point or rhe content of an instantaneous point {a temporal part) as 
in the B-theoretic 4D ''iew (Sider (2001): 59-60), or a particular with 
a duration as in the Russellian view, then we could define two further 
meanings of "eternalism." On B-theoretic four-dimensionalism, "eternal-
ism2" would be the view that "all temporal instants (time points or their 
contenrs) are on an equal ontological footing" and on the Russell ian view, 
"eternalism," would be the view that the existence of temporal relations 
entails the t~mporality of all its terms; that is, all the terms of an R-re-
lation are in rime. Temporal relations arc not a further entity, as Tallant 
maintains, needed to render the terms of an eternalist 1 ontology Rus-
sellian (R-theoretic), rather the terms of R-relalions are ~11 ontologically 
on a par, in being temporal entities since they are in time, because they 
stand in temporal relations. To put the point otherwise, it is in virtue of 
being Rrelated that all terms of the R-series are on an equal ontological 
footing and thus that we can characterize the R-theory as "eternalist/' 
So conceived it is true that a commitment to eternalism 1 is entailed by the 
Russellian theory (and eternalisrn2' by a B-theoretic four-dimensionalist) 
but it is not the case, as Tallant says, that "an [R-theoretic] cternalist [that 
is, an eternalist3] can hold their position without being a [R-J ... theo-
rist" (2008: 118) unless of course an R-rheoretic commitment to temporal 
relations is confused with either McTaggart's analysis of them (eternal-
ism1) or with the B-tbeoretic 4D view (eternalist2), 16 identifications that 
are clearly mistaken, as I have argued throughout this essay. 
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In asserting that the B-theorist is committed to "eternalism" whereas 
the "eternalist" is not committed to the B-theory, Tallant is equivocating 
on (and confusing) the Russell ian conception of the B-theory (eternalisml) 
with either the 4D conception of the B-theory (eternal ism,) or with McTag-
gart's conception of the B-theory (eternalism1), that is, the non-temporal 
C-series without A-properties. Since Tallant does not distinguish the three 
different notions of "eternalism," he thinks that if he can establish the 
ontological gratuity of temporal relations in an eternalist, world or an erer-
nalist2 world then they would also be redundant in a Russellian eternalist3 
world, a conclusion that obviously does not follow. At best Tallant can be 
taken to be arguing that etcrnalism1-a world with no intrinsically tempo-
ral entities-is a preferable ontological alternative to an etcrnalism 1 that 
countenances Russcllian simple, unanalyzable temporal relations. In .what 
follows T shall briefly argue that he never really manages to construct a 
timeless C-thcoretic world and therefore the question of whether eternal-
ism1 is a better option than the alternatives need not be addressed. 
The first step in Tallant's project is to construct a timeless C-world that 
models an R-theoretic world without temporal relations, a project that seems 
to me impossible. To see why this is so, consider the following passage: 
What is a C-world, then? Consider, what we might think of as, a single 
instant. That is, a particular way that the world might be at any given 
time, a particular 3D arrangement of physical objects .. , , This single 
instant looks, if we could look at it, much as a paused video might. This 
is our single instant. Consider this instant to be world w: is time real in 
w? Seemingly not. There are noB-relations. Now add another instant 
to this world. Do we now have a temporal world? Intuitively I would 
suggest not. ... So far there is no reason to think that the mere creation 
of two instants is sufficient for there to be time. We have not arranged 
them properly. (2008: 118) 
In this passage Tallant constructs a world containing instants qua temporal 
entiries-rb ree-dimensional objects that exist in time-and concludes that 
instants are timeless entities in a non-temporal C-world. It is this shift that 
reflects the confusion I just alluded to between a (temporally) eternal, and 
eternal, series and a (timelessly) eternal, series. If we begin by cons.ider-
ing the way the world might be at a given instant, or as Tallant puts it, 
"a particular way that the world might be at any given time" (2008: 118; 
emphasis added), then we have time since we have the simultaneity relation 
between the contents at a time. If we add another instant to that world, that 
is, create another instant (at another time) and continue in that manner, we 
have a temporal world and not a timeless one. 
In personal correspondence, Tallant defended his claim that it is coher-
ent to talk about timeless worlds when he is talking about instants by say-
ing the following: 
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take a combinatorial recipe for possibility, and derive a timeless world 
by subtracting away all 'instants' from an eternalist B-theoretic world, 
other than t. Call this a timeless point. Now, to this we'll need to add 
another timeless point. Is that possible? Given only a pretty weak com-
binatorial principle it looks to be. Simply start with another time-ly 
world; subtract away all instants bar one; that is now another timeless 
point. Add this to our existing timeless world .... So I now have a 
world that includes two timeless points. Is that a world where time is 
real? 
If you're a B-theorist, then intuitively I'd want to say that you should 
say 'no'. There are no B-relations and it is the B-relations that give us 
time. Now, carry on adding timeless points to this world. At no point, I 
want to suggest, does 'time' get in on this picture unless there are E-re-
lations between these timeless points (let's suppose that the relation that 
they stand into one another is something like 'entropic increase across 
their contents'). I think that clears up what I meant by 'instants' in the 
forgoing. That's all supposed to he about the 'instants'/points. 
If we start off with "an eternalist B-theoretic world" and subtract all instants 
except t, then the result is not a timeless point. Given that the B-series is a 
genuinely temporal series, that is, an R-series, since there are intrinsically 
R-relations and simultaneity relations between and among its terms, it fol-
lows that the terms are temporal. Indeed, on the Russellian view, eternalism 
just is the view that the terms of the R-series exist as temporal because they 
are R-related. Thus, subtracting all "instants" except one would not elimi-
nate temporality since there would still be a simultaneity relation among the 
contents at that "instant." To assume that a term of an R-relation when sub-
tracted from the B-series (and bereft of A-properties) is a timeless instant/point 
is an assumption that McTaggart makes, but it obviously begs the question 
against a Russellian at the outset. To put my point otherwise, if Tallant starts 
off with an "eternalist B-theoretic world," then depending on what meaning 
of "eternalist" he is utilizing, the very notion of an "eternalist, R-theoretic 
world" is contradictory (since the objects in an R-theoretic world are tempo-
ral and the objects in an eternalist
1 
world are timeless), and the suggestion 
that one might subtract an instant from an "eternalist3 R-theoretic world" 
and arrive at a timeless instant/point is also contradictory both because there 
are no instants (or duration less times or contents) in an R-world and because 
what does represent a world at an instant are particulars related by a simul-
taneity R-relation, and so are temporal. 
Since Tallant's plan to construct a C-world of timeless instants/points 
from the terms of an eternalist 1 R-theorctic world does not succeed, he 
cannot use a timeless C-world to demonstrate that temporal relations 
are ontological gratuities with no function in an R-world and that conse-
quently if one is an R-theorist that time is unreal. I should add that Tal-
lant's attempt to demonstrate that the phenomenology of temporal passage 
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can he accounted for within a C-world (or presumably an R-world without 
R-relations) is based on a mistaken assumption he shares with Burley and 
others, namely, that on the R-theory the phenomenology of passage is sub-
jective. Tallant says: 
There is no good argument here from the nature of temporal phenom-
enology to the conclusion that time is real. The B-theoretic claim, that 
temporal passage is mind dependent, can be made to work for the 
C-theorist. Put simply, if temporal passage can be mind dependent in a 
B-world it can be mind dependent in a C-world. But there is no obvious 
need for anything over and above this variation of entropy and phe-
nomenology. So, if the phenomenology of temporal passage is merely 
experience at any given timeless point, then there is no prima facie 
reason why occupants of a timeless reality could not also experience 
temporal passage. (Tallant (2008): 122) 
If "temporal phenomenology" is understood R-theoretically, as the 
transition from earlier to later temporal items, then the objects of our 
temporal phenomenology are not mind-dependent and any attempt to 
undermine the R-theory by assuming an eternalist3 world and then 
grounding the phenomenology of time without R-relations is pointless 
and can seem plausible only by greatly distorting the Russellian ontol-
ogy of time and succumbing to one of the erroneous formulations I have 
discussed in this paper. 
In conclusion, I hope to have demonstrated that there is, or rather are, 
genuine ontological debates between A-, B-, and R-theories of time that 
revolve around the status of temporal relations (and transition), the facts 
temporal relations enter into, and the relation of those facts to time, and 
furthermore, that the R-theory, as distinct from the A- and the B-theory, 
should be considered a viable response to those q uestions. 1 g 
NOTES 
l. See Williams (1996, 1998a, 1998b, 20()3), Deng (2010), Oaklander (2001), 
Parsons (2002), Nunn (2000), and Callender (2011 ). 
2. See, for example, Lombard (1999, 2010), Meyer (2005), Ludlow (2004), 
Sider (2001, 2006) Crisp (2004a,b), Stoneham (2009), Dorato (2006a,b) and 
Oaklander (2008) "General Introduction," vol. I, 1-11. 
.1. For my own and others' views on the pros and cons of the various gambits, 
see Oaklander (2004, 2010), Oaklander and White (2007), and Oaklander 
(2008) vol. II, Time and Metaphystcs. 
4. It strikes me that this is an important distinction because it shifts the issue 
away from the question of whether or not only present entities, or past and 
present, or past, present, and future entities exist. There is, perhaps, an 
important truth involved in this way of distinguishing the views but one 
that follows from more fundamental ontological questions about what kiltds 
or categories of temporal entities there are, as I shall argue. Moreover, it 
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gives rise to the typical and standard objections to the legitimacy of the dis-
pute that are avoided if we downplay this way of specifying the terms of the 
debate. 
5. This terminology is, I believe, due to Gustav Bergmann (1964, 1967) who 
did not believe in coordinate qualities, but see C. D. Broad (1925) and Nel-
son Goodman (1951), who both did. 
6. This interpretation is not surprising as there are some grounds for it since 
in the chapter on "Time" McTaggart (1927) discusses Russell in the con-
text of the question whether there could be time or the B-serics without the 
A-series. Nevertheless, the A/B interpretation of McTaggart is mistaken, as 
I argue in Oaklander (1996, 2002a). Other examples of proponents of this 
interpretation, or who seem to adopt an A/B theory of time, include George 
Schlesinger ( 19RO, 1994), William Lane Craig (1998), Yuval Dolev (2007), 
Quentin Smith (1993), and Kit Fine (2006), see especially 405-6. It should 
be noted that while Dolev construes the tensed theory in terms of an AlB 
ontology and the temelcss view as solely a R-relation ontology, his own rejec-
tion of the debate stems from his rejection of what he calls the ontological 
assumption of both views, namely, "that the difference between past, pres-
ent, and future concerns the ontoloRical status of events and things" (2007: 
8). Though interesting and important, l shall not discuss Dolev's argument 
in this chapter except for a brief comment in a later footnote (fn. 15). 
7. This is not quite right, since without temporal becoming the terms of the 
C-serics cannot form a B-series. Of course with temporal becoming, i.e., the 
acquiring and shedding of A-properties by the terms of the C:-series, there can-
not be a B-series either, which is McTaggart's paradox of which I shall say no 
n:orc in this essay, but see Oaklander (2002a). for discussions of McTaggart's 
C-senes see, King- Farlow (1974), Rochelle (199S) and Le Poidevin (1998). 
8. For a defense of Russell's analysis of order in the PrincijJles, see Fred Wilson 
(2007). 
9. For criticisms of Russell's accounts see Orilia (2008, 2010), Tegtmeier (1990, 
2004), Bergmann (1992), and Hochberg (1987). 
10. The entire passage from which the quote is taken is as follows: "Since what 
characterizes a theory of time as tenscless is the fact that it postulates equally 
real tnnes but no ontologically significant notion of the present, then, onto-
logically speaking, there is only one way to be a tenseless theory-the di f-
ferences among tenseless theorists arise in formulating and filli;,g out this 
ontological picture" (Bourne (2007): 10-11). It seems to me, however, that 
my point still holds. 
11. Characterizing the debate between the prescntist and etcrnalist as between 
those who hold that only the present exists and those who hold that past 
present and future exists is problematic for two reasons. First, it gives prima 
facie support for those, like Lombard (2010), who argue that there is no way 
of understandmg tensclcss existence other than did, does, or will exist and 
therefore once again there is no difference between presentism and eternal-
ism. Furthermore, to characterize the B-theory as eternalism, understood as 
the view that past present and future exists, may cause one to overlook the 
R-thcory since on some versions of the B-theory the present is an instanta-
neous state of being, whereas on the R-theory all ent:ties in time have some 
duration. Thus, not only does this way of drawing the distinction fuel the 
debates about the indistinguishability of A- and B-time or prescntism and 
eternalism, it encourages a misunderstandmg of the R-theory, and more 
importantly, it fails to get at what is really at stake regarding the various 
metaphysical theories in the philosophy of time as I shall argue later, espe-
cially in section 3. 
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12. Hence, my dislike of the characterization of the R- orB-theory as "tensdess 
thcorv of time." . 
13. Sec E~win Tegtmeier (1999). 
14. See Craig (1999, 2000) and Bigelow (1996). For criticism see Oaklander 
(2002b,c), and Magalhaes and Oak lander (20 10), Part IV, "The Case Against 
Presentism," 187-248. 
15. Dolev (2007) and Tallant (2007) also argue, in effect, that the B-theory is anti-
realist since it treats transition as a subjective phenomenon. In Oaklandcr and 
White (2007) we offer a detailed response to that criticism. I think it is impor-
tant to point out, however, that there is another aspect of temporal phenom-
ena that is dependent upon our changing psychological attitudes and temporal 
relations toward one and the same event, namely, our experience of the passage 
of events from the future to the present and into the past. 
16. It is easy to confuse R-thcory and four-dimensionalism if one understands 
4D and the R-theory as speci~s of eternal ism and claims that eternal ism is the 
view that past, present, and future times, events, or temporal objects exist 
and arc equally real or ontologically on a par. Thus, another reason for not 
understanding the debate between A- and R-theory or presentism and the 
R-theory in terms of past, present, or future existence iS to avoid the confu-
sion of the R-theorv with the 40 version of the B-theorv. 
17. But why couldn't ._,;c say that there is the unanalyzable i~-relation of simulta-
neity? Tallant mentions the possibility of time being real in virtue of a simul-
taneous camal relation, but we are not talking about analyzing temporal 
relations in terms of causal relations, but in terms of unanalyzable temporal 
relations, so his reply to that possibility is irrelevant. Sec Tallant (2008: 118, 
fn 3). 
18. I have greatly benefited from correspondence and conversations with Erwin 
Tegtmeier and Alan White, who carefully read and commented on several ver-
sions of this chapter. I also wish to thank Ade Artis and Ernani Magalhaes for 
their helpful suggestions, and Adrian Bardon for pointing out some unclear 
passages. While all of the aforementioned helped make this chapter better than 
it otherwise would have been, I alone am responsible for its contents. 
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